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How people evaluate defined contribution, annuity-based pension 
arrangements: A behavioural exploration 
Abstract 
The shift from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) private pension arrangements 
coupled with the widespread reluctance to annuitize retirement savings is causing growing economic 
concern in developed countries. This study considers the impact of the salient decision point made 
explicit in DC schemes, but masked in DB schemes; namely, the exchange of accumulated savings at 
retirement for a future income stream. We investigate issues affecting the evaluation of a potential 
annuity purchase at an aggregate level (whether the purchase provides value for money), at a 
disaggregate level (whether the income stream is adequate in meeting expected needs) and in terms 
of preferred patterns of future income stream. Our results indicate that annuities do not evaluate 
well on these criteria, but we provide insight for policy makers, product developers and financial 
advisors into the issues affecting such evaluations, and into the sort of changes that might make 
annuitization more attractive. 
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How people evaluate defined contribution, annuity-based pension 
arrangements: A behavioural exploration 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, private pension provision in many countries such as the UK and the US has 
moved from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) schemes, partly driven by the costs 
of DB schemes given increased longevity (Watson, 2008). In DC schemes, contributions are 
invested in a pension fund, while working, that is then used to provide income in retirement; usually 
via an annuity, which insures against longevity risk. 
There has been longstanding academic interest in annuities (e.g., Yaari, 1965), but despite 
theoretical innovations (e.g., Davidoff et al., 2005) there is a mismatch between the predictions of 
academic models and observed behaviour. Davidoff et al. (2005) conclude that “[t]he near absence 
of voluntary annuitization is puzzling in the face of theoretical results that suggest large benefits to 
annuitization” (p. 1589). Given the key role of annuities in DC pensions, this lack of public 
enthusiasm for them is problematic, having a potentially adverse effect on pension saving and hence 
social welfare, as consumers seek other means of saving for retirement. Greater understanding of 
attitudes to annuities might help financial advisors and product developers better meet their 
customers’ needs. 
Descriptive behavioural models are now well established in many areas of economics and 
finance. In particular, Hu and Scott (2007) use a number of well-known biases (such as loss aversion 
and mental accounting) to explain the low demand for annuities. Brown et al. (2008) show that 
people have a more positive attitude to annuity offerings when presented within a consumption 
frame, emphasizing the amount of money available to spend, rather than in an investment frame, 
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making clear the inherent risk of annuity products. Benartzi et al. (2011) revisit behavioural 
explanations relating to mental accounting, loss aversion and framing to argue that the same 
behavioural and institutional factors that help understand savings behaviour during the accumulation 
phase of the life cycle are also important in the decumulation phase. They conclude that 
“[c]ompared to the accumulation phase, much less is known, and many interesting puzzles are 
waiting to be solved”. (p. 161) 
We therefore take up the challenge, seeking to add to behavioural understanding of 
annuitization decisions by investigating attitudes at a decision point made salient in DC schemes. 
While DC savings and annuity purchase together produce a retirement vehicle conceptually similar 
to a DB scheme, the separation of these two aspects (savings and income generation) creates a novel 
and highly salient decision point where accumulated savings are exchanged for a future income 
stream. This prompts comparison at an aggregate level of evaluation (considering total values of the 
elements being exchanged); a comparison that is effectively hidden in a DB scheme, where the focus 
of evaluation is a disaggregate exchange of a percentage of salary saved regularly for a given percentage 
of salary received as a pension after retirement. The level of aggregation used in evaluating a pension 
plan is important, since behavioural studies (see, e.g., Gourville, 1998) have shown in other contexts 
that all levels of evaluation may not be used, potentially leading to sub-optimal outcomes. Our 
results indicate that people do not find the pensions provided by annuity-based DC schemes 
attractive, even when considering a substantially larger pension fund than is the norm. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first discuss the theoretical background to 
annuities and the need for a behavioural approach to understanding the annuitization decision. We 
then consider how the level of aggregation used may influence the evaluation of annuities. Next we 
outline key features of the UK pension system, before moving on to discuss the data sample 
employed. We then provide empirical evidence relating to the issues raised, in particular the 
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importance of aggregation levels. We also explore evaluations of annuity income stream patterns, 
with the aim of informing policy and providing insight for product designers  and financial advisors. 
We conclude by discussing our findings and their implications. 
2. Theoretical background to annuities 
2.1. The puzzle in the existing literature on annuities 
People saving for retirement are increasingly having to decide whether saving in a DC pension 
to purchase an annuity is an attractive option. There is a literature of considerable pedigree 
(beginning with Yaari, 1965) analysing the purchase of annuities. This literature tends to use von 
Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility maximizers within Arrow–Debreu complete and 
incomplete market settings, and generally concludes that the reasons for the low level of voluntary 
annuitization observed are unclear. Mitchell et al. (1999), for example, conclude that even if the 
expected present discounted value of payouts from the annuity is only 75% of the purchase price, 
“individuals with preferences such as those modeled here would still prefer to purchase the annuity 
rather than pursue an optimal consumption strategy without such insurance products” (p. 1315). In 
light of this, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) find the small size of the voluntary annuity market in the 
UK a puzzle, and outline a number of possible explanations: bequest motives; the prevalence of 
public sector social security programmes and private deferred benefit pension schemes; the need for 
buffer stock savings to pay for medical and long-term care needs; and poor value for money, due 
either to charges or to lower-than-average individual longevity. However such explanations seem 
inadequate to explain the disparity between theory and reality, and Davidoff et al. (2005) conclude: 
“These results suggest that lack of annuity demand may arise from behavioral considerations” 
(p. 1589). 
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2.2. Behavioural explanations of the low demand for annuities 
Several behavioural explanations have been put forward; that loss aversion may deter people 
from annuity purchase because the potential loss for heirs should an annuitant dies early (Mitchell 
and Utkus, 2004); that people adopt excessive discount rates when evaluating future payments 
(Warner and Pleeter, 2001); that the low take-up of annuities may be due to a general tendency to 
prefer lump sums over flows of payments (Munnell et al., 2002, although evidence is mostly 
unrelated to annuity purchase). 
In response to Davidoff et al. (2005), Hu and Scott (2007) develop a behavioural explanation 
for the unexpectedly low demand for annuities, by drawing on key ideas from the behavioural 
literatures: mental accounting (Thaler, 1999) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). If 
individuals adopt a narrow frame of reference and evaluate annuities in isolation from other 
retirement savings (i.e., in a separate mental account), then annuity purchase might be seen as a 
gamble that increases risk, rather than as longevity insurance. If the initial investment (i.e., the 
annuity cost) exceeds the value of payments received when the annuitant dies, the annuity gamble 
will be evaluated as a loss; while, if the reverse is true, the gamble will be evaluated as a gain. Post-
mortem, evidently, the retiree cannot make this evaluation, but there is evidence that anticipated regret 
impacts on decision making generally (see Zeelenberg, 1999, for a review) and that emotions 
influence financial decisions (e.g., Summers and Duxbury, 2012). Hu and Scott (2007) then draw on 
the loss aversion feature of prospect theory, whereby losses loom larger than gains, to demonstrate 
that the maximum acceptable price for a given annuity is below that implied by expected utility, and 
thus may make the annuity unattractive.  
Brown et al. (2008) show that people’s attitudes towards annuities are influenced by the 
product framing used. When comparing an annuity to alternative financial products within an 
investment frame, where the value of the initial investment and the notion of return on investment 
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are explicitly mentioned, subjects rate the alternative financial products more favourably than the 
annuity. However if the same comparisons are made in a consumption frame, with products 
described in terms of money available to spend, the annuity is more attractive. The consumption 
frame, however, intentionally excludes information about the size of the initial investment used in 
comparisons; whereas, in practice, this would be clear and salient to individuals in reality, and thus 
an aspect of the evaluation is missing.  
3. Theoretical background to our investigations  
In considering how people might evaluate the purchase of an annuity and what might be their 
preferred pattern of income stream in retirement, we are motivated by the psychology literature. 
3.1. Aggregate and disaggregate evaluations of annuities 
Annuities are particularly interesting because they involve the purchase, for a large sum, of a 
set of future, smaller payments spread over what might be a considerable length of time. When a 
plan aimed at providing retirement income is being evaluated, there are two potential approaches to 
this assessment: aggregate and disaggregate. These terms are adopted from the marketing literature, 
where they refer to the temporal reframing of a transaction cost from a single, aggregate expense to 
a disaggregate series of smaller, ongoing expenses referred to as “pennies-a-day” (see, e.g., Gourville, 
1998). In our context, aggregate evaluation represents an overall assessment of whether the plan 
provides value for money relative to the price paid, while disaggregate evaluation involves assessing 
the regular (usually monthly) income received to determine its adequacy to meet future needs. 
The level of aggregation used in evaluating a pension plan is pertinent, because the literature 
demonstrates that, in other evaluation contexts, people do not always use all the relevant levels of 
aggregation necessary for optimal decision making (see, e.g., Read et al., 1999; Gourville, 1998; 
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Ranyard and Craig, 1995). In the field of instalment credit, Ranyard and Craig (1995) find evidence 
that consumers focus on the monthly payments rather than the total amount to be repaid, losing 
focus on total cost.  The pennies-a-day approach used by marketers (see Gourville, 1998) is based on 
a similar concept; that of manipulating the level at which an offer is evaluated by highlighting the 
small daily cost of a product such as insurance cover, rather than the larger annual cost (even though 
charges are not actually paid daily). This approach changes the focus of comparison to petty cash 
purchases such as newspapers or a cup of coffee. In the context of pension plan evaluation, 
aggregation level is significant, because DB and DC schemes differ in the extent to which they 
prompt the two sorts of evaluation. 
DB schemes focus attention on disaggregate evaluation, in a number of ways. First, the 
expected income stream (described in disaggregate terms) is defined with certainty, according to the 
rules of the scheme. This is important because previous research (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
shows that people put a greater weight on certain outcomes than those with even a small 
probabilistic element (the certainty effect). Second, pension income is defined as a percentage of 
final salary, making it easier to evaluate the adequacy of this income in advance of retirement, and to 
calculate any changes required to achieve a desired outcome. Third, while a pension fund is 
accumulated through individual contributions (described in a disaggregate way), the accumulation is 
not framed as a total amount of money; with benefits described rather in terms of contribution 
years, each year adding a percentage of salary to the final income stream. People vary in the extent to 
which they spontaneously aggregate the consequences of repeated decisions in other contexts (e.g., 
Ranyard and Craig, 1995), and so here, too, may not focus on the total amount contributed. Even if 
they do, they may not consider their employer’s contributions, and thus an aggregate evaluation 
would produce an ostensibly far better result than for comparable contributions to a DC scheme. 
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Finally, there is no explicit exchange between the accumulated fund and a future income stream, so 
aggregate evaluation is not invoked. 
In a DC scheme, by contrast, members are provided with information about fund value (via 
regular statements) and explicitly exchange their accumulated savings for an annuity. The aggregate 
evaluation of the annuity is therefore highly salient, as consumers decide if the annuity is good value 
for money. In the case of a DC scheme, therefore, both aggregate and disaggregate evaluation are 
likely at the point of annuity purchase. 
A financially rational approach to the aggregate evaluation of an annuity is to compare the 
actuarially fair price for the annuity with the annuity premium on offer. The actuarially fair price can 
be considered to be the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of annuity payments (see 
Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002), and for a nominal guaranteed annuity can be computed as 
)]1(/)[(
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where A denotes the payment per period from the nominal guaranteed annuity, St denotes the 
probability that the annuitant survives until payment period t, and ij denotes the expected nominal 
short-term interest rate at time-period j. 
Evaluation using this expression requires estimates of future interest rates, inflation (if 
considering a nominal annuity) and the future mortality of the recipient. People may have some 
internal estimate of their mortality based on their health status and observed lifespan of relatives 
(Hurd & McGarry, 2002) or statistical life tables, perhaps subject to certain risk factors (Weir, 2010). 
However, they may have more difficulty in estimating inflation especially if they have low financial 
literacy (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2010; Ranyard et al., 2008). The expression in (1) is also complex. We 
should therefore question whether people will really use such an approach in evaluation and whether 
they will find answers produced by it convincing. If not, this would produce differences in 
evaluation between individuals in the real world and in finance or economic models. As the 
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payments from the annuity are spread out over a considerable time period, the aggregate evaluation 
will also be influenced by the individual’s time discount rate (see Frederick, Loewenstein and 
O’Donoghue, 2003, for a review), which is not considered in this calculation. 
There is evidence in other fields, for example, probability judgement, that people use simple 
rules of thumb known as heuristics when they lack access to relevant information or do not have the 
ability to process it (see Gigerenzer, 2009; Gilovich et al., 2002 for a compilation of research on this 
issue). A potential heuristic in this context, for example, when evaluating a nominal annuity, is to 
divide the pension fund by the number of years one expects to live and assume that the income per 
annum should approximate this value. Although there is evidence that heuristics are effective in 
many contexts (see Gigerenzer, 2009, for a discussion), there is an additional issue in this case; the 
purpose of the annuity. From the perspective of a supplier, the annuity needs to be set at a level 
such that payments can be provided at the agreed rate throughout the lifetime of every annuitant in 
the annuity pool to provide the longevity insurance element. This inevitably means that annuitants 
who die early fund those who are longer lived. Consumers may not recognize this insurance element 
nor value it given the presence of a developed social security system, and may see the annuity more 
in terms of managing the lump sum equitably across their remaining life. This would lead to 
perceptions of poor value for an annuity that has a fair price in actuarial terms. 
While it may be possible to use explanation and argument to influence people’s aggregate 
evaluation of fairness (e.g. explain longevity risk) it is less likely that such arguments could influence 
their disaggregate evaluation, which relates to their needs and/or desires. It is also difficult for 
members of a DC scheme to determine in advance the contributions needed to produce a 
favourable disaggregate evaluation, so the possibility of unexpectedly poor evaluations would be 
stronger with DC schemes than with DB schemes. 
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Annuity products may produce an unfavourable disaggregate evaluation but a good aggregate 
evaluation (or vice versa). Responses to such conflicting evaluations may depend on individual 
circumstances; for example, obtaining a good deal at the aggregate level alongside a poor 
disaggregate evaluation might be acceptable if, say, someone started saving for retirement late in life, 
but could be distressing if someone had saved diligently from an early age. If people’s aggregate 
evaluations are unfavourable whilst their disaggregate evaluations are favourable, they may adopt 
satisficing rationalizations such as “at least it gives me enough to do what I want”. 
3.2. Preferences for patterns of income stream 
Annuities provide a stream of income, which can be conceptualised as a sequence of future 
events. It is therefore pertinent to consider what the research examining preferences for outcome 
sequences implies for evaluations of, and preferences for, patterns of income stream. 
Economic theory suggests that people should smooth the marginal utility of their 
consumption over their lifetime (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954). However, the literature 
examining preferences for sequences is at odds with economic theory. When the sequence of 
outcomes relates to positive events (e.g. entertainment, leisure) it seems that people prefer an 
improving or rising sequence (e.g., Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991, 1993), while when outcomes relate 
to negative events (e.g. noise, pain, poor health), people also prefer an improving (in this case, 
declining) sequence (e.g., Ariely, 1998; Ariely and Loewenstein, 2000; Kahneman et al., 1993; Varey 
and Kahneman, 1992). When considering preferences for sequences of monetary outcomes, the 
evidence for positive monetary outcomes largely supports a preference for rising money or income 
streams,1 although some studies report preferences for falling sequences (Guyse et al., 2002), 
particularly over lifetime durations (Chapman, 1996). In the context of negative money outcomes 
                                                 
1 For example, Barsky et al., 1997; Chapman, 1996; Frank and Hutchens, 1993; Gigliotti & Sopher, 1997; Loewenstein 
and Sicherman, 1991; Matsumoto et al., 2000; Read and Powell, 2002; Schmitt and Kemper, 1996. 
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(e.g., loan repayments), there is evidence that people once more display preferences for improving 
sequences.  Hoelzl et al. (2011) examine loan repayments and find a preference for falling repayment 
sequences over rising ones, even when such preferences result in higher overall costs being incurred. 
Overall, the evidence relating to people’s preferences for money sequences supports a preference for 
improving sequences, although with some exceptions. Frank and Hutchens (1993) and Matsumoto 
et al. (2000) find a preference for rising wage sequences, but the pertinent question here is what 
people prefer when wages end and pension takes over (i.e., what type of annuity income stream they 
prefer). 
Read and Powell (2002) suggest that people do not clearly distinguish income and 
consumption, and therefore look for sequences that are “appropriate” to their expected or desired 
consumption pattern. Their results show that individuals prefer constant or rising sequences of 
income over falling ones, but that people see patterns of health that decline in the retirement years 
as “appropriate”, because it is what they expect. Read and Powell also indicate that individuals do 
not have homogeneous motivations for their choices; some use concepts such as maximization, 
while others emphasize self-control or closeness to “ideal” outcomes. 
In a retirement context we might expect to find that people would focus on the impact of 
issues such as changing health status, and so might find rising income sequences less attractive. Read 
and Powell (2002) report respondents who thought of this even in a whole-life context, for example, 
commenting that “ ‘[the rising sequence] seems unnatural and the wrong way round to be having 
most income at your disposal when you’re oldest and less likely to actually need that increase’ ” 
(p. 453). 
Income stream preference may be constrained by the size of the pension fund; for example, 
choosing a Retail Price Index (RPI)-adjusted income stream might reduce the initial amount received 
below what is seen as viable. People may also vary in their preference for rising, steady or falling 
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income streams in real terms. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) suggest that longer-lived individuals 
should prefer annuities that are back-weighted relative to those chosen by individuals with lower life 
expectancy, and thus that the choices of people in higher socio-economic groups, with lower 
mortality rates, should reflect this preference, though the evidence for this is mixed. Hamermesh 
(1985) and Hurd and McGarry (2002) use evidence from survey-based studies to suggest that people 
do have informed and plausible views about their life expectancy, beyond the information that can 
be gleaned from their observable characteristics, which could influence individual preferences. 
Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) also suggest that risk-averse individuals may be willing to pay more 
for a real product than a nominal product, to protect against inflation risk. 
4. UK institutional arrangements 
In this section we provide some key facts about the UK pension system, which is based on a 
combination of state and private provision. The state provides a basic state pension at a modest level 
(£102.15 p.w. in 2011–12) to people with a fairly complete work record (30 years or more). There is 
also a state second pension, which is partly related to lifetime earnings and can increase the basic 
state pension by up to around an additional £60 p.w. These pensions are not means tested and are 
payable in addition to any private pension provision or other income. The state also provides 
Pension Credit, a strictly means-tested benefit, to provide people with a minimum income of 
£137.35 p.w.. thus providing a “safety net”. The various state benefits are indexed in line with the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) of inflation and are currently payable from age 65 for men,. Women 
traditionally received their state pensions at age 60 but their retirement age is being equalized with 
that of men by 2018.  By 2046, state pensions will be payable to men and women from age 68.2 
                                                 
2 Comprehensive details of UK state pension provision are available from the UK government at GOV.UK, 
www.gov.uk. (This site replaced Directgov, www.direct.gov.uk, on 17 October 2012.) 
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Private pension provision is complex, with some employers making provision for their 
employees and many individuals making provision for themselves. A majority of public sector 
workers are in a DB scheme. By contrast, in 2010 around one third of private sector employees were 
in an employer’s pension scheme, but only about 10% of these were in DB schemes. The level of 
private sector employer provision has been declining in recent years, and there has been a strong 
trend from DB to DC schemes; in 1997 nearly 50% of employees were in a pension scheme 
provided by their employer and about one third were in DB schemes (IPSPC, 2011: p. 26). 
Employees not in an employer-provided pension scheme, and self-employed people, may save for 
their retirement via personal pensions, which are individual DC schemes. The shift from DB to DC 
schemes has considerably reduced aggregate contributions to pension schemes. In 2009 the average 
employer contribution rate for private sector DB schemes was 16.5% of salary, but for DC schemes 
was 6.4% (ONS, 2011). To increase pension savings the UK government is introducing a new DC 
pension plan from 2012, which will have to be offered by all employers without an existing scheme 
and into which all employees will be automatically enrolled (with the option to withdraw). This 
scheme will mandate minimum contributions of 4% of earnings by the employee, 3% of earnings by 
the employer and 1% tax relief from the government. 
Historically, it has been difficult to get a meaningful idea of the distribution of individual 
pension wealth in the UK because many people accumulate assets in many different pension 
arrangements, and this information was not systematically collected. More recently, evidence from a 
national survey by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has started to address this issue 
(see Banks et al., 2010). The survey shows that, in the period 2006–2008, the median net wealth of 
adults in households where the head was aged 55–64 was close to £200,000 (Banks et al., 2010, 
Figure 4.3).For adults of mid-level education, on average, almost 50% of the assets would be in 
housing, a little over 30% in illiquid but safe assets (mainly DB pensions), just under 10% in liquid 
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and safe assets (mainly bank accounts), and around 7% in each of risky assets (mainly stocks) and 
DC pension schemes. Thus, average non-housing wealth would be in the region of £100,000. 
A key institutional factor is the nature of the regulations governing the payment of funds from 
pension schemes. In the UK benefits from DB schemes have to be provided mainly as a regular 
income. Beneficiaries are not notified of the value of underlying funds, only of the income they will 
receive in retirement. There are also complex regulations governing how the income can be paid; in 
broad terms, payments must increase in line with inflation, subject to limits. For DC schemes it has 
long been compulsory to use the funds to purchase an annuity within a particular time after 
retirement (by age 75, in recent years). This requirement has always been unpopular and has recently 
been removed after many years of lobbying (HM Treasury, 2010). The UK annuity market is the 
largest in the world and is highly sophisticated in the diversity of products it offers (HM Treasury, 
2010: p. 17); largely as a result of the historic requirement to annuitize funds from DC schemes.  
Another relevant institutional feature is the treatment of medical expenses. There is much 
speculation in the literature that the possibility of having to meet large and unpredictable medical 
expenses contributing to reluctance to purchase annuities. In the UK context, however, this will not 
be an important issue, given the state-funded National Health Service (NHS) remains committed to 
free health care at the point of delivery (see NHS, 2010). 
In summary, UK institutional features have important implications for this study. Many 
people will have rights to state pension benefits or income from DB schemes which are actually in 
annuity-like form, providing an income for life. The existence of the Pension Credit safety net 
means that they will always have some level of access to economic resources. Avoiding premature 
exhaustion of assets is often cited, at least informally, as one of the advantages of annuitization, 
often described in terms of longevity insurance. Most people have substantial additional assets which 
could be annuitized if they desired. The UK market is highly sophisticated and competitive, so a lack 
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of suitable products is not a factor in reluctance to annuitize. The existence of a state-funded health 
service removes the need for individuals to retain liquid assets to cover the risk of large medical 
expenses, which eliminates one of the main suggested arguments against annuitization. 
5. Data 
The empirical evidence for this study comes from the Financial Well-being Survey (FWS) 
developed by the International Institute of Banking and Financial Services (IIBFS), which explores 
the attitudes of a representative sample of the UK population to key financial aspects of their lives, 
and provides a unique panel database. Members of the panel are recruited from random public 
mailings, providing a geodemographically coded sample with wide-ranging ages and levels of wealth. 
Relevant sections of the questionnaire are included in the Appendix. A total of 281 panel members 
responded, comprising a sample with a mean age of 56.11 years (median 57, range 22–94) and 
approximately 40% men to 60% women.3, 4 The survey is only distributed to adults; which accounts, 
at least in part, for the higher median age in our sample than that (median 40) in the UK population 
as a whole (CIA, 2012). The survey distribution profile may also account for the higher proportion 
of women in the sample than that (female population 50.4%) in the UK overall (CIA, 2012), since 
the male population is higher in the younger age groups excluded from our sample. However, given 
the focus of our research an adult sample is appropriate. 
Given retirement in the UK is no longer (as of 2011) compulsory at age 65, annuity purchase 
at the time of the survey was not compulsory until age 75, and our interest is in attitudes to annuities 
in general, it is relevant to investigate the attitudes of respondents aged over 65 as well as those of 
working age. In the sample, 71.4% of respondents were aged 65 or under (of these, 65.5% were in 
                                                 
3 While this may appear low, it compares favourably with other similar surveys. For example, Canova et al. (2005) 
distributed questionnaires to 302 members of the Exeter School of Psychology’s general public panel, receiving 141 
usable responses, of which 97 were used in their analyses. 
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employment), 66.4% were non-retired and 33.6% retired. Respondents were drawn from wide-
ranging backgrounds, both occupational (33.0% professional, 14.5% managerial, 10.1% supervisory, 
15.9% clerical, 10.9% skilled labour, 8.0% unskilled labour, 7.6% other) and educational (20.8% no 
qualifications, 9.6% vocational, 15.8% O level, 9.6% A level, 26.2% university level, 12.3% 
professional, 5.8% other).  
6. Survey method and results 
In this section we investigate empirically the issues raised above in relation to consumers’ 
annuity evaluations. Each subsection begins with a statement of the issue, followed by an analysis of 
the empirical evidence collected. 
6.1. Satisfaction in aggregate and disaggregate evaluations of annuity returns 
Individual satisfaction at aggregate and disaggregate levels of evaluation was investigated by 
ascertaining whether annuity outcomes were perceived as a fair return in terms of, respectively, the 
price paid and adequacy to meet expected needs. Respondents were presented with a scenario (see 
Appendix) entailing a pot of money with which to purchase an annuity; the latter concept being 
explained within the scenario. (The term “pot”, rather than “fund”, conforms to common usage in 
popular discussions of the topic.) The size of the investment fund (£100,000) is specified in the 
scenario to control for the disparate circumstances of respondents and the different savings levels 
accumulated towards retirement (expected for those not yet retired and achieved for retirees). 
Respondents were then asked, if an annuity was purchased with the £100,000 pot at age 65, 
how much annual pension they thought they would receive and how much they thought they should 
receive for the amount paid, with the latter question tapping into their views on value for money in 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Some of the following results are based on a reduced sample, owing to missing data and within-subject analyses. 
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relation to the exchange. The difference between the would- and should-receive values thus provides 
an indication of aggregate evaluation. Respondents were also asked how much pension they thought 
they would need to receive to be able to live comfortably in retirement; which, when compared to 
their would-receive value provides an indication of disaggregate evaluation. 
Table 1 reports the mean values and standard deviations for would, should and need responses 
for the sample as a whole and split by gender. A GLM repeated-measures analysis of responses 
revealed a significant main effect of response type (F(1.071, 113.548) = 119.452, Greenhouse–
Geisser correction for violation of sphericity ε = 0.536, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.53), with pairwise 
comparisons indicating that would, should and need are all significantly different (p < 0.01, Bonferroni-
adjusted). Women gave significantly lower need values than men (p < 0.01). Retired and non-retired 
respondents did not differ significantly in their responses and so are not separated in the analysis. 
Tests were made for the effect of demographic variables on responses for would- and should-receive. 
The fixed pension pot and retirement age in the question should ensure that the would value is not 
affected by any individual characteristics other than gender; and, controlling for gender, there were 
indeed no significant differences in would values due to age, employment status (employed or not), 
education level (degree level-plus or not) or income. Should values might reasonably be affected by a 
respondent’s conceptual model and knowledge of annuities. Tests showed that only age had any 
impact, reducing the should value (p < 0.01), but this effect was only significant at the 10% level 
(p = 0.095) when employment status and education were taken into account. This result could be 
due to an increasing interest in potential outcomes as retirement comes closer, or to observing the 
experience of colleagues who retire. Nonetheless, given that comparisons are within subjects, this 
does not affect the above results comparing the three values: would, should and need. 
< TABLE 1 HERE > 
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The values respondents thought they would and should receive were compared with those 
actually available in the annuities marketplace. The best rates for men were £7,104 p.a. and those for 
women, £6,684 p.a. Separate single-sample t-tests on men and women show that the would values are 
not significantly different from the real values (for men, t = 0.088, p > 0.1; for women, t = 1.038, 
p > 0.1) but the should values are (for men, t = 3.335, p < 0.01; for women, t = 5.781, p < 0.001). 
This suggests that, although people have fairly realistic expectations of annuity outcomes, there is 
dissatisfaction with the annuity incomes on offer in terms of value for money (unfavourable 
aggregate evaluation). Given that the need values significantly exceed both the would- and should-
receive values, this suggests that the returns from an annuity purchased with £100,000 at 65 would 
not be seen as adequate to meet people’s needs (unfavourable disaggregate evaluation). Even when 
the basic state pension is added to the income from an annuity purchased with £100,000, the 
income generated is still significantly less than the need values given by respondents (for men, 
t = 8.944, p < 0.001; for women, t = 8.601, p < 0.001), providing further evidence of a generally 
unfavourable disaggregate evaluation. This is pertinent given that people’s typical pension funds at 
the point of annuity purchase are, in reality, usually substantially smaller than the £100,000 value 
used in this study. UK figures indicate that the average pension fund used to buy an annuity has 
been in the region of £25,000 since 2005 (Pensions Policy Institute, 2008). 
Taken together, these results suggest that annuity returns are producing undesirable results 
from both aggregate and disaggregate evaluation perspectives, and are seen as providing neither 
good value for money nor sufficient income to meet people’s anticipated needs. 
6.2. Factors linked to aggregate and disaggregate evaluation 
We would expect different factors to influence aggregate and disaggregate evaluation, given 
their focus, respectively, on the overall exchange and the expected annual income relative to 
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individual needs. In both cases there are variables capturing individual differences, which we analyse 
in more detail below, and control variables that, while theoretically relevant, are fixed across 
respondents and thus are not examined further. 
6.2.1. Aggregate evaluation 
Individual difference variables (coefficient name) 
 Life expectancy (LifeExp) How long the respondent expects to live determines the expected 
number of payments to be received from the annuity.5 This number combined with the size of 
each payment yields an aggregate value for the expected income stream and hence the annuity as 
a whole. Some respondents may have an idea of their own life expectancy, using knowledge of 
their health status and/or the longevity of close family members, while others might base their 
estimate on the general population value. Differences in perception of life expectancy will lead 
people of the same age and gender to put different values on the expected income stream, and 
thus on their aggregate evaluation. 
 Temporal discount rate (DiscRate) Respondents with a high discount rate will put less value on 
income received at a particular point in the future than do those with a lower discount rate, and 
individuals’ discount rates will thus affect aggregate evaluations. Discount rates were estimated 
from questions asking respondents to state equivalent present/future values for various lump 
sum values at different time points. (See further discussion of this variable below.) 
Fixed control variables 
 Pension pot size This represents the cost of the annuity and is the basis of a value-for-money 
evaluation of the expected income stream. Pension pot size (£100,000) is fixed in the survey. 
                                                 
5 We included a survey question to check for understanding that the same starting fund would generate different 
amounts of annual income depending on the remaining life expectancy. Given a scenario of winning a competition prize 
of either £250,000 immediately or an annual income for life, respondents were asked to state the annual income levels at 
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 Annuity income The market-determined annuity income per annum, which informs the value 
of the expected income stream and is the basis for comparison with the amount of annuity 
income the respondent thinks should be received. The annuity income per period is dictated by 
the annuities market and is constant, given the fixed pension pot and evaluation age (65).6 
 Current interest rate Interest rates determine the level of annual income achievable by 
investing the pension fund (in lieu of annuitization) and taking income alone while retaining the 
capital. The current interest rate is constant, since respondents all answered at the same time. 
6.2.2. Disaggregate evaluation 
Individual difference variables 
 Expenditure (Expend) The respondent’s current annual expenditure (excluding mortgage-
related expenditure, typically completed by retirement), which relates directly to expected needs. 
 Income (Income) The respondent’s current annual income, which provides a point of 
comparison for perceptions of relative wealth before and after retirement. 
Fixed control variables 
 Annuity income The market-determined annuity income per annum (as above in aggregate 
evaluation) is the basis for comparison with the respondent’s expected needs and is constant. 
6.2.3. Dependent variables  
For each respondent, the should-receive and need responses can be used to construct measures 
of aggregate and disaggregate evaluation, respectively, as computed below. 
                                                                                                                                                             
which they would be equally happy with both options, in relation to themselves and then to those significantly younger 
or older. GLM within-subjects comparisons confirmed the presence of the required conceptual grasp. 
6 The actual annuity income per annum is included in the calculation of the dependent variables (aggregate and 
disaggregate evaluation measures) and hence should not also be included in regression models as an independent 
variable. 
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 Aggregate evaluation (AggEval) The difference between the amount respondents think they 
should receive as annuity income from the given pension fund and the actual, market-determined 
amount (with larger values indicating more dissatisfaction). 
 Disaggregate evaluation (DisEval) The difference between the amount respondents think they 
need, to be able to live comfortably, and the actual, market-determined annuity income (with 
larger values indicating more dissatisfaction). 
For both measures the actual annuity rates given earlier were used in the computation.  
6.2.4 Regressions 
We ran the following regression models for aggregate and disaggregate evaluation measures  
AggEval = a + b1.LifeExp + b2.DiscRate (2) 
DisEval = a + b1.Expend + b2.Income (3) 
The coefficients of LifeExp and DiscRate in the aggregate evaluation model are insignificant, 
suggesting that respondents’ estimates of their own life expectancy and mean discount rate did not 
influence their aggregate evaluations. At first sight this is surprising but, as discussed in our 
theoretical review, the calculation of an annuity value is complex and, in such situations, people 
often fall back on heuristics. While many different heuristics are conceivable (see Hedesström et al., 
2007, for an examination of heuristics in pension decisions), a plausible one would be to divide the 
amount of the pension fund by the length of their remaining life expectancy at 65. To investigate 
whether such a heuristic might have been used, we calculated the resultant value for each respondent 
by dividing the £100,000 pension pot by the self-reported life expectancy less 65. This individual-
specific amount was then compared using a paired sample t-test with the amount the respondent felt 
they should receive from the annuity. No significant difference was found (t = 0.516, p > 0.1), thus 
supporting the idea that people may indeed use such a heuristic in aggregate evaluation. 
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The coefficients of Expend and Income in the disaggregate evaluation model are both positive 
and significant (Expend = 2.00, p < 0.05; Income = 0.293, p < 0.001; adjusted R2 = 0.235), indicating 
that higher levels of current spending and income contribute to increased disaggregate 
dissatisfaction. The results are robust to the inclusion of variables to control for respondents’ wealth 
components (saving/investment, housing and pension wealth) which were all insignificant. The 
results are also robust to the inclusion of demographic variables (age, occupational background and 
gender), but education level does affect the relationship. Education level and spending are 
significantly correlated (p < 0.05), leading to both variables being marginally significant in the 
regression. Analysis of shared and unique variance shows that Expend has the greater unique 
variance explained (4.5% versus 3.9%), confirming its relationship to disaggregate evaluation. 
Overall, then, we find evidence of respondents using theoretically expected variables in 
disaggregate evaluation, where the comparison is straightforward and the information easily 
available. In aggregate evaluation, however, we find evidence of respondents falling back on a 
heuristic approach in the face of more complex calculation, where a method might be unknown, and 
where notions such as discount rates affect perception but may not be consciously conceptualized. 
6.3. Preferences for patterns of income stream 
As discussed above, people may vary in their preference for rising, steady or falling future 
income streams from an annuity. For example, there may be a preference among those with greater 
life expectancy for back-weighted annuities (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002), and such a preference 
may also be related to income and education levels via their impact on mortality. Alternatively, 
people may consider what they could do with the money at different ages, and thus may prefer to 
have more money at a younger age while they are healthier and more able to enjoy it. Practical needs 
may dictate a different decision; where people are concerned, for example, about provision of long-
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term care, then rising income streams may be preferable. Risk aversion could also play a part in this 
decision; risk-averse individuals might prefer to avoid falling income streams for fear of finding 
themselves with insufficient income, should they live long enough (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002). 
Conversely, people might worry about “getting their money’s worth” in a rising income stream, 
being more aware of the potential loss from dying in the early years of an annuity. So the preference 
may depend on which risk is seen as most relevant. Hu and Scott’s (2007) behavioural explanation 
treats annuities as a gamble in the presence of loss aversion, and would imply that people should 
prefer falling income streams as these give the greatest chance of “getting their money’s worth”. 
In our study respondents were shown three graphs portraying rising, steady and falling 
patterns of income received in retirement. Values were displayed in real terms to avoid responses 
being confounded by differing estimates of inflation, and the actuarial value was held constant 
across the three scenarios. Respondents were told that all three income streams would cost the same 
to purchase and were asked to rate how attractive each option was to them, using a 0 to 10 scale 
where 0 meant “not at all attractive” and 10 meant “very attractive”. Results are shown in Table 2. 
< TABLE 2 HERE > 
A GLM repeated measures analysis shows that the attractiveness ratings differ significantly 
across the three income stream types (F(1.611, 323.856) = 45.567, Greenhouse–Geisser correction 
for violation of sphericity ε = 0.806, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.185). However, pairwise comparisons 
reveal that rising and steady income streams are not rated significantly differently from each other 
(p > 0.05), but both are rated significantly more attractive than falling income streams (p < 0.001, 
Bonferroni-adjusted, for both). 
Nonetheless, of those who expressed a clear preference, rising income is the first choice for 
58% of respondents, with 25% preferring steady and only 18% preferring falling.7 The relatively low 
                                                 
7 Percentages sum to 101 due to rounding.  
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percentage of respondents expressing a preference for falling income streams would seem more in 
line with Finkelstein and Poterba’s (2002) idea of providing adequate income at older ages than with 
the implications of Hu and Scott’s (2007) suggestion concerning “getting their money’s worth”. 
6.4. Reasons for choice of income stream 
Our survey also sought the reasons for the income pattern choices above. Of the 281 
respondents, 162 stated a clear reason for their choice. A textual analysis of these responses was 
undertaken, and the results are shown in Table 3. Some of the reasons relate to the expected pattern 
of future economic needs and some are based on subjective value attitudes and hedonic expectations 
(utility in a broad sense). In most cases, the stated reasons clearly imply a particular pattern of 
income stream preference. It may seem unexpected that inflation is given as a reason for income 
stream preference, given that the income streams in the survey were specified in real terms. 
However, two factors make inflation a rational concern. First, and perhaps most importantly, retired 
people in the UK have been found to suffer higher real rates of inflation than government inflation 
figures would suggest (research by Grant Thornton (Steed, 2006) indicates that they suffered 
inflation that was approximately one third higher over the preceding three years).8 Second, state 
benefits and final salary pensions in the UK are currently linked to changes in prices, via the CPI. 
The rate of change in prices, however, is generally lower than rate of change in wages (see, e.g., 
Wilkie, 1995), thus prompting rational concerns about differential wage inflation. 
< TABLE 3 HERE > 
When the reasons given by respondents are cross-tabulated with their most preferred income 
patterns, there is a high level of agreement between the patterns implied and those selected (see 
                                                 
8 See Ranyard et al., 2008, for a discussion of the limitations of average price change measures such as the CPI, and the 
potential impact on perceptions of inflation. 
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Table 4). Multivariate ANOVA9 and regression analyses confirm a statistically significant 
relationship between the ratings for the different income streams and the reasons cited. We can thus 
be confident that there is congruence between respondents’ choices and the explanations they give.  
< TABLE 4 HERE > 
Reasons for income pattern preferences were considered in the light of rationales put forward 
in previous research on annuities. The impact of individuals’ discount rates was also examined, given 
their influence on expected income stream evaluations. We discuss these reasons below. 
6.4.1. Future needs 
Many respondents cited their expected future pattern of needs as the reason for their income 
stream choice, in line with Read and Powell’s (2002) findings on the effect of appropriateness. In 
particular, 21% cited higher needs and expenses when very old as reasons for choosing an increasing 
annuity. This is broadly in keeping with the possible need for buffer stock savings to pay for medical 
and long-term care needs, proposed by Finkelstein and Poterba (2004). There was however a lack of 
homogeneity in views of the likely pattern of future needs, with 8% of respondents expecting lower 
needs and expenses when very old. Some people may have reasons for expecting a particular pattern 
of future needs based on factors such as their family medical history and their own circumstances. 
6.4.2. Utility 
As discussed in our review of theoretical issues, there is a body of academic work that 
discusses the benefits of purchasing annuities in terms of lifetime expected utility (e.g., Mitchell et 
al., 1999; Kingston and Thorp, 2005). Not surprisingly, none of the respondents explicitly 
mentioned utility in their responses, although those saying how much they might “enjoy money” are 
describing a similar concept. There was no mention of the benefits of smoothing lifetime 
                                                 
9 To meet the requirements of the technique for the MANOVA analysis, reasons cited by less than five individuals were 
excluded.  
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consumption, and some responses indicated that differing levels of consumption were either ideal or 
at least to be expected at different ages. About 15% of respondents indicated they would enjoy the 
money more (get more utility out of it) at a younger age suggesting a relationship between 
respondents’ ratings of the income stream patterns and how money would be enjoyed more when 
young (or equivalently, less when older). We find that such statements are indeed significantly 
predictive of the rating given to rising and falling income streams, with the expected signs on the 
coefficients (rising: coefficient for money being enjoyed more when younger = 3.928, p < 0.001, 
adjusted R2 = 0.160; falling: coefficient for money being enjoyed more when younger = 4.303, 
p < 0.001, adjusted R2 = 0.24). Thus our findings suggest that the utility derived from a given sum of 
money is not considered age invariant; a concept that has not featured heavily to date in the finance 
or economics literature on annuities.10 
6.4.3. Life expectancy 
As discussed above, Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) suggest that longer-lived individuals 
should prefer annuities that are back-weighted relative to the annuities chosen by those with lower 
life expectancy. Similarly, Hamermesh (1985) and Hurd and McGarry (2002) suggest that people 
have informed and plausible views about their life expectancy beyond the information that can be 
gleaned from their observable characteristics. About 7% of our sample made their choice based on a 
personal view of their own life expectancy. Of these, 40% expressed a preference for falling income 
streams, and indicated concerns about how long they would live as a reason for this choice. While 
this offers some evidence in support of the implications in Hu and Scott (2007) regarding life 
expectancy, it is based on relatively few respondents. Some respondents did give self-reported life 
expectancy estimates, which allowed us to test directly, on a larger sample, the implied relationship 
                                                 
10 Although Browning and Crossley (2001) acknowledge that the marginal utility of consumption may not be age 
invariant. 
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between life expectancy and income stream preference. Regression analyses show no significant 
relationship between life expectancy and ratings for the three patterns of income (rising: coefficient 
for life expectancy = 0.035, p > 0.1, adjusted R2 = 0.003; steady: coefficient for life 
expectancy = 0.043, p > 0.1, adjusted R2 = 0.007; falling: coefficient for life expectancy = 0.004, 
p > 0.1, adjusted R2 = –0.010) and no significant difference in life expectancy between groups of 
respondents who had different first-choice preferences for income stream (F(2,95) = 2.580, 
p > 0.05; pairwise comparisons, Bonferroni-adjusted, show no significant differences). While we do 
not provide a test of Hu and Scott’s (2007) explanation of the annuity puzzle based on mental 
accounting and loss aversion, our results do not support its implication that annuitants (especially 
those with low life expectancies) would tend to prefer falling income streams. There are various 
reasons why our respondents might not behave in accordance with this conjecture (for example, 
they may not view annuities as separate gambles or they may not have prospect theory value 
functions), but our data do not permit further examination of the reasons. 
The relationships between income stream preference and education, individual income and 
household income (because of their potential relationship to actual life expectancy) were 
investigated. The only significant relationship indicated that those with higher levels of education 
gave lower ratings to rising income streams, counter to Finkelstein and Poterba (2002). The results 
were robust to the inclusion of  wealth measures (saving/investment, housing, pension ownership), 
which were insignificant. Respondent age is not significant in the model comparing rating of income 
streams, but does bring the difference between rising and steady streams to significance. 
6.4.4. Risk aversion 
Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) suggest that risk-averse individuals might be willing to pay a 
higher risk premium for a real product than a nominal product, to protect against inflation risk. We 
found a strong tendency to cite inflation as a factor in respondents’ choice of income pattern, 
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although this reason was not explicitly linked to the concept of risk, and so these concepts may be 
differentiated in people’s attitudes. Our data includes a variable measuring self-reported risk 
preferences, but no significant relationships were found between risk preference and income stream 
preference. 
6.4.5. Discount rate 
Individuals’ discount rates might be expected to affect their preference for a particular income 
stream. To investigate this we asked respondents to state equivalent present/future values for 
various lump sums at different time points, and were thus able to obtain mean estimates of their 
discount rates. The results from a multivariate ANOVA of the attractiveness ratings for the three 
income stream patterns with discount rate suggest that discount rates do not influence ratings for 
the income streams (F(3, 166) = 1.737, Wilks’ lambda = 0.970, p > 0.1, η2 = 0.030). However, closer 
inspection via univariate analyses reveals parameter estimates for discount rates of 0.057, 0.047 and 
0.128, respectively, for rising, steady and falling income streams. The signs on the discount rate 
coefficients for rising and falling income streams are as expected (negative for rising, positive for 
falling), but only the latter is significant (F(1, 168) = 4.373, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.025), indicating 
that people with higher discount rates give falling income streams higher ratings, as expected. 
6.4.6. The mismatch between preferred and purchased income streams 
The results of relative preferences for different income streams (see Table 4) indicate a 
mismatch between what respondents preferred and what annuitants actually purchase: the large 
majority of respondents preferred an annuity that either increases or is static in real terms, whereas, 
in reality, most annuitants in the UK market purchase a nominal annuity. There are two possible 
explanations for this. First, annuity choices may be affected by the other assets and income rights 
that individuals hold, some of which may already provide sufficient protection against inflation. 
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Second, annuity choices may be limited by the small size of fund that most people have available. 
This might force people to take the highest possible initial income (based on a non-increasing 
annuity) to be able at least to live on this starting amount. 
7. Discussion 
Our findings indicate that the evaluations people make at the salient decision point of 
exchanging their pension savings for an annuity are not positive. Annuities fail to satisfy consumers 
either at an aggregate level (in terms of providing a good return for their pension fund) or at a 
disaggregate level (in terms of meeting their retirement income needs). Although people have fairly 
realistic ideas about how much they would receive from an annuity, they do not think it is as much 
as they should receive. This dissatisfaction is particularly worrying in that the responses to our 
survey were based on a larger-than-average pension fund, so it is unsurprising that voluntary annuity 
purchase in the UK is low. 
While theoretically expected variables were found to be related to respondents’ disaggregate 
evaluations of an annuity, this was not the case for their aggregate evaluations. Further work would 
be needed to fully understand the evaluation process, but our investigations suggest that people may 
be using a heuristic approach to aggregate evaluation, and we find evidence that dividing the pension 
fund amount by the remaining life expectancy at the time of purchase is consistent with individual 
responses. While this does not take account of the pooled risk aspect of the longevity insurance 
provided by an annuity, it may be that people do not expect this to be expensive, or that they do not 
consider it at all in a system with state support available. Without this focus, the loss of capital when 
an annuitant dies shortly after the annuity is taken out has been a source of discontent (see, e.g., 
Burrows, 2010) and this has led to removal of the requirement to purchase an annuity. Mainstream 
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models in finance and economics do not consider this sort of relatively simple heuristic evaluation, 
with its narrow focus on “this transaction” rather than the context of lifetime expected utility. 
In terms of the income stream provided by the annuity, respondents generally rated falling 
income streams (in real terms) lower than those that were steady or rising, and over half the 
respondents with a preference gave their highest rating to a rising income stream. Ratings of income 
streams were influenced by the individual’s discount rate, with falling income streams being given 
significantly higher ratings by those with higher discount rates, as expected. In reality, because of the 
use of nominal income streams, most annuitants in the UK do purchase a falling real income stream. 
This discrepancy is worth further investigation. It may arise because the average UK pension fund 
does not generate an initially adequate income under other income stream patterns, so that 
purchases are cost-constrained to a pattern most would see as non-optimal, contributing to a 
negative evaluation of annuities. Economic modelling by Davidoff et al. (2005) suggests that a 
mismatch of income stream with desired consumption still supports a high level of annuitization as 
optimal. However, the lack of products that can both match desired consumption patterns and 
provide a sufficient initial income is clearly a factor in the lack of uptake in annuities. 
Analysis of the reasons given by respondents for their income stream preferences shows that 
individuals are heterogeneous in their attitudes and may use a wide range of factors when evaluating 
annuities. Some of these are related to the expected pattern of future economic need and some are 
based on subjective value attitudes and hedonic expectations. Nearly half of respondents indicated 
that they expected the utility of income to vary with age, with this tendency being significantly 
related to the ratings given to both rising and falling income streams; a concept that is not currently 
considered in the mainstream finance and economics literature, and merits further investigation. 
The responses here indicate a need to revisit DC pension schemes in the light of public 
dissatisfaction with the pensions they provide. Pension saving has some aspects in common with 
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other saving, and so a move away from pension products, driven by the feeling that these do not 
meet people’s needs, would not necessarily reduce overall saving levels, but rather move savings to 
alternative vehicles. However, such vehicles do not restrict use of the funds accumulated, and this 
gives rise to two concerns. First, in relation to individual welfare, other vehicles do not provide the 
self-control measure of a pension scheme, and people may thus be tempted to use the money for 
purposes that seem more pressing at a particular time in their lives, or be persuaded to do so by 
family or friends. Second, this lack of restriction may also have implications for government. If 
people save in alternative vehicles and are tempted to dip into the funds before retirement, they may 
end up requiring more state support than would otherwise be the case. It is thus in the interests of 
both governments and individuals to encourage the exploration of alternative pension products that 
address these issues. If pension saving is to be successfully encouraged, then the pension plans it 
generates need to be seen as attractive to individuals at both the aggregate and disaggregate level. 
For academic models to be relevant to both practitioners and policy makers, they need to take 
account of people’s preferences, beliefs and decision models. Future research should embrace this 
view, seeking to understand individual behaviour that appears suboptimal but perhaps reflects a 
different conceptual model of the problem. It is only when armed with such understanding that 
meaningful policy debate can be entered into and practical financial advice offered. In the meantime, 
the behavioural insights offered here concerning how individuals evaluate annuity purchase 
decisions should enable financial advisors to better advise their clients and perhaps help them 
circumvent their natural behavioural inclinations to shy away from annuitization. The results also 
provide insights for product providers, indicating characteristics that influence product 
attractiveness and might therefore be a focus in product design. 
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Appendix: Relevant sections of  the IIBFS Financial Well-Being 
Survey11 
Receiving an income in retirement 
Imagine that you are saving for your pension in a money purchase scheme. This builds up a pot of 
money that can be used to provide you with a pension in retirement. If you continue saving until 
you retire at age 65, you will have a pot of £100,000 to provide you with a pension. (If you are 
already retired, imagine that you were in this position when you retired). 
One way you can get a pension using the money you have accumulated is to buy an annuity. This 
could provide you with an income, which is the same for every year until you die. 
Q34. If you are buying an annuity with the £100,000 at 65, how much do you think you would 
receive each year as your pension? (Please give us your best guess)   
Q35. How much pension do you think you should receive each year to get a fair return for your 
£100,000? 
 […] 
Q44. How much pension do you think you would need to receive each year to be able to live 
comfortably in retirement? (Please give us your best guess) 
 […] 
                                                 
11 Formatting not as per original. 
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Patterns of future income in retirement 
We want to know what pattern of income you would prefer in retirement. The diagrams below show 
the income that you would receive in today’s money terms, i.e. in real terms, for three options. 
Each of these options would cost the same. 
The main thing we are interested in is whether you would prefer a rising, steady or falling income. 
Option 1:  Pension amount slowly rises in real terms 
[Graph showing annual income gradually rising from circa £5,500 to circa £15,000 from age 60 to 
95.] 
Option 2:  Pension remains the same in real terms 
[Graph showing annual income steady at circa £8,500 from age 60 to 95.] 
Option 3:  Pension amount slowly falls in real terms 
[Graph showing annual income gradually falling from circa £13,000 to circa £4,500 from age 60 to 
95.] 
Q51. How attractive are each of the options to you? (Please indicate by selecting a ranking on the 
scale of 0 to 10, where 0 = not at all attractive, and 10 = very attractive) 
[Separate 10-point scale provided for each of Options 1–3.] 
Option 1: Pension amount slowly rises in real terms 
Option 2: Pension remains the same in real terms 
Option 3: Pension amount slowly falls in real terms 
Q52. What are the reasons for your choices in Q51? 
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Tables 
Table 1 
GLM within-subjects analysis of per annum income responses to would-receive, should-receive and 
need questions. 
 
Mean values (£) Would Should Need 
Whole sample 7315.25 9740.66 20078.07 
 (4648.88) (5708.30) (10938.45) 
Men 7057.07 9166.97 22699.96 
 (3916.45) (5174.72) (12156.76) 
Women 7525.00 10582.77 18291.39 
 (5224.06) (6107.05) (9688.93) 
a. Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 2 
GLM within-subjects analysis of attractiveness ratings for rising, steady and falling future income 
streams. 
 
Mean attractiveness  Rising Steady Falling 
Whole sample 6.14 5.41 3.02 
 (3.34) (2.67) (3.10) 
a. Values in parentheses are standard deviations 
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Table 3 
Broad reasons for choice and implications for preference of retirement income pattern. 
 
Reason (implication for preference) 
Number 
stating this 
reason  
(Percentage 
of valid 
respondents) 
Higher needs/expenses when very old (rising) 34 (21.0) 
Can earn more money when younger (rising) 1 (0.6) 
Just prefer a rise (rising) 18 (11.1) 
Inflation (rising or constant) 43 (26.5) 
Easier to budget/plan (constant) 10 (6.2) 
Enjoy money more/less when younger/older (falling) 25 (15.4) 
Not able to live on initial amount (falling) 4 (2.5) 
Lower needs/expenses when very old  (falling) 13 (8.0) 
Own life expectancy (low/high) (falling if low, rising if high) 12 (7.4) 
References to risk (not clear, dependent on risk concerned) 2 (1.2) 
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 Table 4 
Cross-tabulation of stated reasons for preference and actual preference of patterns of income 
streams. 
 
Reason 
Income stream 
Total 
 Rising Steady Falling 
Higher needs/expenses when very old 27 2 2 31 
Can earn more money when younger 1 0 0 1 
Just prefer a rise 15 3 0 18 
Inflation 35 7 1 43 
Easier to budget/plan 2 8 0 10 
Enjoy money more when younger (or less when older) 1 7 16 24 
Not able to live on initial amount 1 2 1 4 
Lower needs/expenses when very old  0 2 11 13 
Own life expectancy (low/high) 1 5 4 10 
References to risk 0 2 0 2 
Total 83 38 35 156 
a. The number of observations (n = 156) is less than that reported in Table 3 (n = 162) due to the removal of cases of 
tied preference. 
